New project: Governance of global telecoupling – and two open post-doc positions

By Jens Newig

In recent years, more and more research has been pointing to the importance of distant connections of natural and social processes for issues of global unsustainability. Land-use scientist have labelled this phenomenon, which might entail global commodity chains, migration, or the spread of diseases, “telecoupling”. While there have been substantive advances in describing the flows and the associated implications for environmental sustainability, we know little about how to govern such telecoupled global linkages.

Our new project, which is jointly led by Andrea Lenschow from Osnabrück University, Edward Challies and myself, will investigate how state, private and non-governmental actors have sought to govern the (un)sustainability implications of telecoupling in the past; what (polycentric) policy-networks have emerged in doing so; and, together with key state and non-state actors we will map out scenarios for more effectivley governing global telecoupling for environmental sustainability.

We’ve already published two papers on this (see below), which seek to contribute to a conceptual framework.

For deepening conceptual work and conducting empirical case studies, we will be employing two full-time post-docs for three years. The job ad can be downloaded here.

Funding: German Research Foundation.

> More information on the project GOVERNECT.

Papers

Challies, E., Newig, J., & Lenschow, A. (2014). What role for social-ecological systems research in governing global teleconnections?. Global Environmental Change : Human and Policy Dimensions, 27, 32-40. 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.04.015

Lenschow, A., Newig, J., & Challies, E. (2016). Globalization’s limits to the environmental state? Integrating telecoupling into global environmental governance. Environmental Politics, 25(1), 136-159. doi:10.1080/09644016.2015.1074384. [Free Open Access Content]

Collaboration – a panacea!?

For several years now, more collaboration between different types of stakeholders has been suggested as a contribution to solving various environmental and sustainability problems. Recently, this trend of pointing out that more collaboration would make things better has increased, at least in my perception: In many of the presentations I heard at the 12th IFSA Symposium at Harper Adams University, UK it was suggested that people need to collaborate to solve this and that problem. Just now, I read yet another article arguing that farmers need to collaborate to find common ground for land stewardship and, based on this, discuss future redesign of agri-environmental schemes (Raymond et al. 2016) – aside from countless other publications putting forward similar arguments. To exacerbate this, I myself am deeply involved with collaboration: In my PhD, I myself have used the collaboration argument (Velten et al. 2015) and am working on finding out what makes collaboration for sustainable agriculture successful. Additionally, in the project MULTAGRI, of which I’m part, we seek alternative governance approaches that enable farmer collaboration for more meaningful biodiversity management in agricultural landscapes.

Having said that, I have my doubts about the power of collaboration to solve seemingly all (environmental and sustainability) problems that there are and I’ve become a bit frustrated with this concept. There are (at least) three sides to these doubts and frustrations: First, collaboration does not automatically lead to sustainable outcomes. I recently heard an example of farmers with neighbouring fields who collaborated to get rid of the strips of natural vegetation separating their fields: They agreed on an alternating ownership of these strips so that in one year one farmer would be allowed to plough under the strip and add it to his field, in the next year the other farmer would be allowed to do the same. Thus, in this case collaboration did not foster sustainable land management, which would preserve or even enhance biodiversity, but rather served the self-interests of the farmers. One could say that this happened because only farmers and with that only one type of interests were involved in this collaboration. And indeed, there is evidence that if stakeholders who are inherently interested in the preservation of ecological assets are involved in collaborative decision-making processes, the generated outcomes are of better environmental quality (Brody 2003). However, involving ENGOs, for instance, is not a guarantee for sustainable outcomes because groups representing environmental interests may be co-opted while collaborating with groups dominated by other interests (Kochskämper et al. 2016). Thus, even bringing together different types of stakeholders does not necessarily prevent collaborative decision-making processes from bringing about outcomes that contribute little to overall sustainability.

Second, collaboration is easy to suggest but hard to do. While collaboration certainly has great potential to help identify common ground, complement resources, increase innovation potential, improve social capital etc. it also is very time and energy-intensive. If we all followed the suggestions for more collaboration that have been made, we literally would not be doing anything else than sitting in different groups of people and discussing what we would like to do in our neighbourhood, in our children’s schools, about the forest next to our city, about infrastructure in our city, about water management, about the agriculture and food system in our region, about energy generation in our community etc. Furthermore, finding common ground and agreeing on goals, plans, and measures with people whose mental frames and dominant values are very different from one’s own can be very stressful and sometimes impossible. So, what I am saying here is that collaboration may be one way to find solutions but people’s restricted time and other resources set a limit to it.

Third, making the point for more collaboration seems to be very fashionable at the moment. Thus, if we just argue in our publications that collaboration can help solve the issues we identify and address in our research, this seems to be good enough as a conclusion. Of course, that does not really prevent us from thinking more thoroughly and deeply about other solutions. Yet, having the ‘obvious solution’ of collaboration at hand already, we have little incentive to look into different directions. Maybe it is just my personal impression, but I cannot lose the feeling that we are missing out on something as most of our attention is drawn towards collaboration.

Despite my doubts and frustrations with collaboration, I still think that having different, relevant actors solve a problem together can be very useful to tackle certain environmental and sustainability problems. However, in dealing with the concept and the practice of collaboration we should keep some things in mind in order to address the above-mentioned issues:

First, all collaborative efforts need an explicit normative framework that defines their purpose and overall goals, thus guiding the decisions and actions of the involved actors. Of course, we can hardly prevent the occurrence of merely self-interested or even malevolent collaborations. But at least for the collaborations that are established in order to foster sustainable outcomes, this purpose should be made clear to the involved actors. Thus, there is a chance that the outcome of the example of the collaborating farmers above would have been different if from the outset the explicit goal of this collaboration had been to bring preservation of biodiversity into accordance with agricultural production.

Second, we should generally not be too quick to present collaboration as the wondrous cure to whatever the problem may be. Rather, for each problem we should thoroughly weigh all kinds of (marginal) costs against all types of (marginal) benefits of a collaborative approach as well as all possible risks against all likely gains. And only if we come to the conclusion that collaboration could be worth the effort, we should go for it.

Linked to this is, third, that we should try to look beyond collaboration and think of different, maybe new solutions. At the moment, I do not know what these ‘different, maybe new solutions’ could be. But so it is even the more important that we keep our eyes and minds open for them.

References

Brody, S.D., 2003. Measuring the Effects of Stakeholder Participation on the Quality of Local Plans Based on the Principles of Collaborative Ecosystem Management. Journal of Planning Education and Research 22 (4), 407–419.

Kochskämper, E., Challies, E., Newig, J., Jager, N.W., 2016. Participation for effective environmental governance? Evidence from Water Framework Directive implementation in Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. Journal of environmental management 181, 737–748.

Raymond, C.M., Reed, M., Bieling, C., Robinson, G.M., Plieninger, T., 2016. Integrating different understandings of landscape stewardship into the design of agri-environmental schemes. Envir. Conserv., 1–9.

Velten, S., Leventon, J., Jager, N.W., Newig, J., 2015. What is sustainable agriculture? – A systematic review. Sustainability 7 (6), 7833–7865.

Now published: Leverage Points for Sustainability Transformation

Joern's avatarIdeas for Sustainability

By Joern Fischer

Finally, the first paper is out from our Leverage Points project. It’s led by Dave Abson, and lays out a conceptual framework and research agenda, all around the notion of “deep leverage points”. Please share it through your networks.

Screen Shot 2016-06-28 at 10.31.56.pngThe paper draws on Donella Meadows’ notion of “deep leverage points” – places to intervene in a system where adjustments can make a big difference to the overall outcomes. Arguably, sustainability science desperately needs such leverage points. Despite years of rhetoric on sustainability science bringing about “transformation”, the big picture is still pretty dull: globally at least, there is no indication that we’re starting to turn around the patterns of exponential growth that characterize our era. A potential reason is that much of sustainability science has focused on parameters and feedbacks, rather than system design or “intent” (see above) — when actually, it’s changing a system’s design…

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New doctoral programme “Democracy under Stress” – 7 PhD positions

Leuphana’s Center for the Study of Democracy has been awarded a major grant for funding a total of 14 PhD scholars. The first 7 scholarships are advertised now.

The doc­to­ral pro­gram in­ves­ti­ga­tes how the new po­li­ti­cal, eco­no­mic, eco­lo­gi­cal, and cultural chal­len­ges (‘stress fac­tors’) that mo­dern de­mo­cra­cies en­coun­ter are per­cei­ved, dealt with, and sol­ved in view of the exis­ting ten­si­on bet­ween po­li­ti­cal le­gi­ti­ma­cy and re­stric­ted per­for­mance. It will fur­ther look into the im­pli­ca­ti­ons that dif­fe­rent mo­des of pro­blem-hand­ling have for the ‘sur­vi­val chan­ces’ of de­mo­cra­cy. This two­fold re­se­arch agen­da will be ana­ly­zed in three fiel­ds of stu­dy that re­pre­sent the core func­tions of de­mo­cra­cies: par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on, re­pre­sen­ta­ti­on, and in­clu­si­on.

The first field of stu­dy is con­cer­ned with how ci­ti­zens in de­mo­cra­tic so­cie­ties per­cei­ve cur­rent so­cie­tal – e.g. environmental or sustainability-related – chal­len­ges in light of in­cre­a­sing ’eman­ci­pa­ti­ve’ va­lue ori­en­ta­ti­ons and how the­se per­cep­ti­ons are trans­la­ted into po­li­ti­cal be­ha­viour (participatory democracy).

In the frame­work of the se­cond field of stu­dy, the re­pre­sen­ta­ti­ve ca­pa­ci­ty of po­li­ti­cal in­ter­me­di­a­ry or­ga­niza­t­i­ons as well as po­li­ti­cal in­sti­tu­ti­ons wi­t­hin and outs­ide the na­ti­on sta­te will be ana­ly­zed (representative democracy).

By me­ans of selec­ted po­li­cy fiel­ds (e. g. en­vi­ron­men­tal, cli­ma­te, sci­ence and me­dia po­li­cy) the third field of stu­dy looks into the is­sue of how new forms of po­li­ti­cal par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on in­ter­act with tra­di­tio­nal in­sti­tu­ti­ons, ac­tors, and pro­ces­ses of re­pre­sen­ta­ti­ve de­mo­cra­cy (inclusive democracy).

Deadline for submission of applications is 12 June, 2016.

For more information, please see http://www.leuphana.de/en/research-centers/zdemo-english/doctoral-program-democracy-under-stress.html

Participation and collaboration for sustainable flood risk management?

By Ed Challies

Floods are the most frequently occurring natural disaster globally, and flood damages are expected to increase drastically over the coming decades due to climate change, demographic trends, and on-going development on flood plains. This will play out differently and pose unique challenges in different regions, and Europe is no exception. Floods in Europe inflict greater economic losses more frequently than any other natural hazard, with trillions of Euros worth of assets and millions of people exposed (see Jongman et al. 2012). A recent study reported by the Europe Joint Research Centre predicts annual damages to rise from EUR 5.6 to 40 billion by 2050, and the number of people affected to rise from 200 thousand to over half a million over the same period.

With projections such as these, it is no wonder that the challenge of better managing (and reducing) flood risk is high on the political agenda in Europe. The recurrence of severe floods, like those on the Elbe and Danube rivers in 2013, and the 2015-16 floods in Britain and Ireland, only serve to heighten the sense of urgency among citizens and officials. In some ways this serves to increase awareness and engagement and provide impetus for action at multiple levels – from households and municipalities right up to member states and the European Union. On the other hand, the high stakes and direct threat that floods pose to human wellbeing, present challenges for flood risk management planning. This is particularly so in light of the current policy shift away from the previously dominant paradigm of flood protection and defence, and towards a more integrated flood risk management approach. Most importantly, this entails the management of risk (as opposed to the management of floods), and implies the negotiation of socially acceptable levels of exposure and risk – an issue that is inevitably sensitive and often controversial.

Flood 2013Photo: Flooding in Passau (Inn/Danube), Germany, 2013. Licence CC BY-SA 2.0; Stefan Penninger.

Flood risk is commonly defined as comprising (1) the magnitude of flood hazard (frequency and severity), (2) the exposure of human activities, and (3) the vulnerability of exposed elements. There are, therefore, multiple points for intervention to address and mitigate flood risk, ranging from information and awareness-raising campaigns and early warning systems, to flood protection measures, land-use planning and ‘ecological’ measures such as wetland restoration and afforestation. In this sense, efforts to confront flooding touch on a wide range of activities, policy fields and stakeholders within river basins. No wonder, then, that flood risk management is typically characterised by high stakes, competing interests, and conflict!

With the aim of improving the effectiveness and legitimacy of flood risk management, participatory and collaborative approaches are increasingly advocated, which should bring stakeholders and the affected public on-board in planning and decision-making. One prominent development in this direction in the European context is the 2007 Floods Directive, which aims to reduce the effects of flooding through an explicitly participatory approach to cyclical planning. Under the Directive, member states are legally obliged to encourage the active involvement of all interested parties in the planning process. Because every country and responsible authority is starting from a different baseline in terms of flood risk management and participatory governance, however, an array of approaches are currently unfolding across the EU. The rationale behind this ‘mandated participatory planning’ approach (Newig & Koontz 2014) is very much an instrumental one: The European Commission expects that it will produce better plans, more widely accepted and implementable measures, and more effective flood risk management.

Precisely because so much stock is put in participatory approaches to deliver improved and effective planning and management, there is a need to examine how participatory public decision-making is playing out in the field of flood risk management, and to consider what potential participation holds. Participatory and collaborative approaches in environmental planning and management more widely have certainly had mixed success in terms of achieving legitimacy and effectiveness. What about the field of flood risk management poses particular challenges for participatory planning and implementation? What potential do participatory approaches hold for fostering sustainable and just flood risk management? These questions motivate a recent special issue of Environmental Science and Policy jointly edited by members of our research group here at Leuphana University, and drawing together twelve contributions from leading scholars in the field. The collection examines, from a variety of disciplinary perspectives, some of the key issues around justice and power, acceptance and legitimacy, social learning, multi-level governance and policy integration, and governance learning in flood risk management.

With climate change and developmental pressures continuing to exacerbate multiple drivers of flood risk, it will be crucial for research to focus on how policy and governance responses perform in mitigating this risk. As authorities like the EU increasingly advocate participatory approaches, but recurring flood events continually trigger calls to revert to expert-led planning and engineered flood protection solutions, researchers must also critically examine collaborative planning. This should ideally be done in partnership with authorities and practitioners in ways that can support transdisciplinary learning and adaptation – not only about effective measures for sustainable flood risk management, but also about how to conduct effective and legitimate participatory planning towards this end.

Special Issue: Check out the special issue in Environmental Science and Policy: Participatory and Collaborative Governance for Sustainable Flood Risk Management: An emerging research agenda (Edited by Ed Challies, Jens Newig, Thomas Thaler, Elisa Kochskämper, and Meike Levin-Keitel).

References

  • Jongman, B., Ward, P. J., & Aerts, J. C. J. H. (2012). Global exposure to river and coastal flooding: Long term trends and changes. Global Environmental Change, 22(4), 823-835.
  • Newig, J., & Koontz, T. M. (2014). Multi-level governance, policy implementation and participation: The EU’s mandated participatory planning approach to implementing environmental policy. Journal of European Public Policy, 21(2), 248-267.

Wind energy conflicts in forested landscapes- Insights from stakeholder interviews in Maine, USA and Rhineland-Palatinate, Germany

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By Nataly Jürges

Renewable energy projects are increasingly realized worldwide as part of a global strategy to reduce emissions from fossil fuels and to reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels such as natural gas and oil. However, the transition towards renewable energies is not without problems. For example, wind energy projects in forests are an emotional topic in different parts of the world, and can develop into serious conflicts. Conflicts about renewable energy projects are an important topic from a sustainability governance perspective. The governance of wind energy conflicts is an important issue in the transition towards renewable energies. As part of my PhD project, I examined wind energy conflicts in forested landscapes in Maine, USA and Rhineland-Palatinate, Germany. Between summer 2014 and beginning of 2015 I spent 8 months at the School of Forest Resources at the University of Maine, where I did a case study on wind energy conflicts in forested landscapes as part of my PhD research.

Conflicts over wind energy projects in forests are complex, often involving many stakeholders, such as forest owners, local residents, wind energy companies, nature conservationists and recreationists. Forty-six interviewees from Rhineland-Palatinate and Maine shared their experiences and perspectives on wind energy conflicts with me. Surprisingly, the arguments of involved parties were similar in both regions. Even though differences in the overall governance structure made for some slight differences in decision-making processes in the case study regions, wind energy conflicts turned out to be quite universal (at least in the cases of Maine, USA and Rhineland-Palatinate, Germany).

For example, transparency, or rather a perceived lack of transparency in decision-making, was mentioned in stakeholder interviews in both cases as an important factor in the development of conflicts and controversies around wind energy projects:

“What we’re speaking to is really a sore spot in this town because we would argue and we wouldn’t never back down on that, they kept it secret for a year, they kept it secret for as long as they could to get the ordinance in favor of the developer, and the developer kept it secret to build his alliance and that really matters in terms of how everybody feels about it once they come aware. It would have been much more respectful of the town government to once they were being asked by a developer to consider a huge project, which is way, way out of proportion out of anything that’s ever been going on in [name of the town]. If you’re a small town in Maine and a gigantic development project is coming into town, I feel that they are absolutely obligated to make that as public as possible from the first idea. From the conception of it and they did absolutely the opposite. There was nothing and we are 3,000 feet away from the project. We would be hugely impacted if they went up and they had, they never showed us any respect at all in that regard.”

(Interview quote from an interview with residents near a planned wind energy project)

The most appropriate level or scale for decision-making about wind energy projects was an important aspect in discussions on how to govern wind energy projects most efficiently, effectively, and legitimately. Different perceptions existed in both case study areas as to whether higher or lower administrative governance levels are more appropriate to decide about controversial wind energy projects.

Local decision-making tradition was mentioned as an important argument for the choice of the most appropriate decision-making level, particularly in Maine:

“We’re a state that loves its local control, so, for better or for worse, that’s what we have. You know, there are times when local control is great because those communities understand the needs, wants and desires of their community. Sometimes it can be a draw back if you’re trying to make sort of a systemic change in the way a society operates. So, for example, if you’re trying as a society to move away from fossil fuels and into more clean energy, sometimes local control can be challenging. But that doesn’t mean that we should do away with it.”

(Interview participant from Maine)

However, other interview participants did not share the preference for local decision-making. Consideration of nature conservation interests was seen as being better realized at higher governance levels:

“Everything concerning the protection of species cannot be considered at the local scale. Especially if it is a mobile species, as bats and birds, then you just have to have the greater perspective. Check main occurrence, where are the main migratory lines.”

                (Nature conservationist from Rhineland-Palatinate)

The perception of the most appropriate level or scale for decision-making about wind energy projects was often based on conflicting frames about what wind energy projects are about. For example, some interviewees saw wind energy projects mainly in the context of nature conservation and species protection, while others saw wind energy projects as a topic related to local regional development. These conflicting issue frames quite often resulted in different understandings about the most appropriate decision-making level.

If at first you don’t succeed.. Institutional Failure in the Public Sector

A review of Public Policy and Administration’s special issue on policy failure

By Pim Derwort

In many ways, failure is an inevitable part of life. In many cases, it is also something we would rather not be reminded of and may be hard to accept. Some of the most inspirational movies and stories teach us how to accept or ‘let go’ and ‘move on’ from failure, or to learn from our mistakes on a personal level and generally become better persons for it. But what happens when failure occurs in the public sector?

In the public sector, ‘getting it wrong’ can have significant (and damaging) consequences for those affected. It can significantly damage the public’s trust in the political system, damage individual’s careers and, in extreme cases, may even lead to injury or loss of life. While failure may be just as inevitable, it is all the more important to prevent or learn from mistakes. Yet, in the public policy realm, plenty of examples remain of cases where important lessons remain unlearned, mistakes are buried, responsibility is deflected and the causes of the original failure continue unchallenged. Often, the same – or at least similar – mistakes are repeated time and again.

So what exactly do we understand by ‘failure’? Failure is often defined as the “lack of success”, or alternatively, as a “lack or deficiency of a desirable quality”. Judged by this definition, ‘failure’ is a negative concept, defined largely by the absence of concepts with more positive associations like ‘success’ or ‘quality’. As with general definitions of ‘failure’, definitions of ‘policy failure’ vary, and there have been considerable conceptual difficulties in providing a commonly accepted definition of ‘policy failure’. In its simplest form, failure has been defined as the ‘mirror image of success’ (McConnell, 2010). The difference between success and failure is, however, not always clear-cut. In many cases policies are not an outright success or outright failure, and may succeed in some respects while failing in others. There are many reasons why a policy may fail. A policy may be poorly designed and fail to tackle the problem it was intended to solve or largely be symbolic (e.g. Newig, 2007). Alternatively, a well-designed policy may unexpectedly fail due to unforeseen circumstances or simply not have the effect intended.

Failure can be measured in different ways, and is often subject to interpretation. Disagreement over whether a policy actually should be considered to have failed may arise depending on who is asked (see e.g. Bovens & ‘t Hart, 2011). Policy failures, inevitable or not, are not necessarily problematic. If it is possible to identify the causes of the failure, it may also be possible to adapt the policy or to replace it with one that is better suited. More problematic, however, are persistent policy failures, in which the same type of failure is repeated over time

In July 2015, Public Policy and Administration dedicated a special issue to the topic of ‘policy failure’. In this issue, the authors argue that, despite the volume of literature on policy success and failure, much of it has so far focused on conceptualisations of (different types of) failure, with considerably less attention for the sources of the problems leading to recurrent failures (Howlett, Ramesh & Wu, 2015, p.209). In addition, it is argued that a great deal of the research only examines the causes and characteristics of failed policies in individual cases, rather than looking at the broader political or socio-economic environment in which these policies are embedded (Peters, 2015, p.261), thus limiting our ability to learn from past mistakes. Therefore, the goal of this special issue is to improve our understanding of recurring failures by “examining a wide range of factors both within and beyond a policy subsystem” (Howlett, Ramesh & Wu, 2015, p.209).

Some of the contributions in this issue help improve our understanding of ‘policy failure’. In an attempt to overcome some of the conceptual difficulties, McConnell develops a ‘working definition of ‘failure’, arguing that “a policy fails, even if it is successful in some minimal respects, if it does not fundamentally achieve the goals that proponents set out to achieve, and opposition is great and/or support is virtually non-existent (2015, p.221). Failure is not only limited to policies and other contributions focus on failure in terms of, e.g. ‘state failure’, ‘governance failure’ and ‘implementation failure’ Importantly, Peters (2015, p.264) argues specific failures may only be “a symptom of a broader failure in governing”, and that, to be able to identify these forms of failure, it is important to look beyond just the proximate causes of observed policy failures per se, instead aiming to identify the more deeply seated roots of failure.

In my opinion, there are two main “lessons” to take away from this special issue:

  • Firstly, future research should continue to build on Peters’ thoughts and look beyond individual categories of failure, instead developing a better understanding of the bigger picture. To this end, I would like to propose that it is important to look at the concept of ‘institutional failure’.
  • Secondly, throughout the special issue, and indeed the wider literature, ‘failure’ largely continues to be regarded as something negative. McConnell is the only author to briefly refer to possible “positive benefits” that might ensue from failure in his contribution (2015, p.227), unfortunately without going into further detail. Further attention should be paid to the ways in which failure can allow us to learn important lessons and act as a driver for positive change.

The concept of ‘institutional failure’ has been interpreted in different ways, depending on the disciplinary perspective adopted. From a neo-classical economics perspective, it has been defined as “private and government sector failure” (Pitelis, 1992). Alternatively, from a sustainability perspective, it has been defined in terms of resource sustainability or the inability to conserve resources (Acheson, 2006). The innovation approach (Woolthuis et al., 2005) divides institutional failure into ‘hard institutional failure’ (failures in the framework of regulation and the legal system) and ‘soft institutional failure’ (failures in social institutions such as political culture and social values). Finally, while not everyone agrees (see e.g. Stacey & Rittberger, 2003), another perspective refers to institutions as organisations, regarding institutions as actors/players in their own right. Following these different definitions, the concept of ‘institutional’ failure is sufficiently broad to capture all of the different concepts mentioned above.

In his work, Newig (2013) identifies these as “productive functions” of failure, in that they may allow for valuable lessons to be learned, can trigger adaptations towards sustainability or purposefully destabilise existing unsustainable structures. Currently, these ideas are not yet sufficiently developed and there appear to be few systematic studies into the lessons that (institutional) failure can provide to scholars and practitioners. Focusing on institutional failure and its productive functions will therefore be at the heart of my PhD project over the next three years.

 

References:

Acheson, J.M. (2006). ‘Institutional Failure in Resource Management’. Annual Review of Anthropology, 35, pp.117-134.

Bovens, M. and ‘t Hart, P. (2011) Understanding Policy Fiascoes. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

Howlett, M., Ramesh, M. & Wu, X. (2015). ‘Understanding the persistence of policy failures: The role of politics, governance and uncertainty’. Public Policy and Administration,30(3-4), pp. 209-220.

McConnell, A. (2010). Understanding Policy Success: Rethinking Public Policy. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

McConnell, A. (2015). ‘What is policy failure? A primer to help navigate the maze’. Public Policy and Administration,30(3-4), pp.221-242.

Newig, J. (2007). ‘Symbolic Environmental Legislation and Societal Self-Deception’. Environmental Politics, 16(2), pp.279-299.

Newig, J. (2013). ‘Produktive Funktionen von Kollaps und Zerstörung für gesellschaftliche Transformationsprozesse in Richtung Nachhaltigkeit’. In: Rückert-John, J. (Ed.)(2013). Soziale Innovation und Nachhaltigkeit, Innovation und Gesellschaft. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien.

Peters, B.G. (2015). ‘State failure, governance failure and policy failure: Exploring the linkages’. Public Policy and Administration,30(3-4), pp.261-276.

Pitelis, C. (1992). ‘Towards a Neo-classical Theory of Institutional Failure’. Journal of Economic Studies, 19(1), pp.14-29.

Stacey, J. & Rittberger, B. (2003). ‘Dynamics of formal and informal institutional change in the EU’. Journal of European Public Policy, 10(6), pp.858-883.

Woolthuis, R.K., Lankhuizen, M. & Gilsing, V. (2005). ‘A system failure framework for innovation policy design’. Technovation, 25, pp.609-619.

Do we all agree on the importance of learning and knowledge integration for environmental governance?

By Jens Newig

A couple of days ago, I received the report of a symposium I was invited to earlier this year. The symposium, held in May at the Stockholm Environment Institute, was about “Environmental Governance in an Increasingly Complex World: An Interdisciplinary Exchange on Adaptation, Collaborative Learning and Knowledge Integration”, gathering some 25 researchers and practitioners (You can access the website here, and the report here).

Learning and knowledge integration were the key issues discussed by speakers like Ryan Plummer (adaptive co-management), Bernd Siebenhüner (transdisciplinarity), Arjen Wals (social learning in education), Stephen Elstub (deliberation) and myself (governance learning). There certainly was a lot of interesting detail from empirical and conceptual studies. One key insight, however, emerged more implicitly: There seemed a remarkable consensus in the whole group that more learning – either through participation, co-management, or transdisciplinary interaction – would benefit sustainability and environmental governance. To quote from the report, knowledge integration and learning were even seen as “a necessary precondition for transformative change toward more sustainable futures”.

I certainly agree that without learning no major leap forward can be achieved – whether this concerns sustainability or not. I just have this slight unease with the high level of consensus on the issue. Are we still asking the right questions? Are we as reasearchers still learning (sic!) enough when studying learning? Going against the grain, a couple of contributions appeared to indeed question the dominant focus on standard models of learning. Arjen Wals, for example, brought forward the idea of un-learning. While this is not new as such, I believe it would be worth discussing more thoroughly in this community. (In the Leverage Points project – WP 2 “Re-Structure” – we will focus on related topics of de-institutionalisation for the benefit of sustainability). Perhaps it is as important to study what kind of (unsustainable) beliefs, convictions, practices, institutions we need to do away with, as it is essential to examine what new things we need to learn.

New perspectives on a society beyond oil

By Lisa Fischer

Norway is a country with an interesting energy profile. It is known to be rich on oil and gas, which now account for about a quarter of Norway’s GDP and almost half of its exports by value (The Economist, 2015). Despite rich oil and gas reserves, Norway’s domestic energy supply is dominated by hydropower (nearly 40%) (IEA, 2011). In light of a recent encounter with Norwegian energy transition researchers, however, it seems to me that Norwegians are starting to redefine their relationship towards oil. In October 2015 I attended the conference “Beyond oil” in Bergen (http://spacelab.b.uib.no/conference-beyond-oil/). The conference name itself suggests that Norwegians are starting to seriously think about alternatives and ways to realize a transition to a society beyond oil.
Joining the conference, I was especially inspired by three new perspectives that I believe are worth sharing:

1.) Respect for oil workers
I learned that Norwegian professionals in the oil sector, once a highly respected and prestigious workforce, have lost their good reputation. One of the two speakers, who mentioned the current “shaming” of oil workers in Norway, was arguing for showing respect for those employed in the industry. He mentioned the pioneer oil divers, who installed pipelines, took samples etc. – some of whom died in the course of doing their job. The idea of acknowledging work done by oil workers seems rather new in the current energy debate. Could we possibly introduce this way of thinking into the German discussion about energy supply, e.g. in the case of coal workers or workers in the nuclear power sector? The speakers went even further, and explained the idea to create new climate jobs and to address the dilemma of losing traditional jobs along the path to climate neutrality. I do like the idea of acknowledging what has been done by the (oil) workers for us, not only have they worked and sometimes still work under precarious conditions, but by doing so they secure(d) our energy supply and push(ed) economic prosperity. By taking care of them we would possibly enhance the acceptance of renewable energies and counteract resistance as we take a new and more sustainable energy pathway. It might be one way to actually work together and not against each other. It would also demonstrate that we implement the idea of sustainable development more holistically, by also taking care of the social pillar.

2.) Leaving the oil in the ground.
This is a radical and challenging idea. There is no global agreement of regulating or maintaining resources in the ground in individual states. The international community has no legal jurisdiction to decide how e.g. oil and gas discoveries should be regulated. Every state has the right to development (“Declaration on the Right to Development” by the United Nations, 1986). I learned that Kenya has just recently (2012) discovered oil. Companies are still in the exploration phase, so not actually extracting the oil from the ground. While discussing with Kenyans the idea of leaving the oil in the ground, researchers discovered that it is considered a rather absurd idea. Leaving resources in the ground seems quite a radical idea compared to the current way of thinking, but I do think that it is an idea worth discussing, and one which also arises when we think about new methods such as fracking for shale gas or extracting oil from tar sands.

3.) Broadening the discussion for a society “beyond oil”
It seems that in Norway the discussion about a society beyond oil is taking place on a relatively large scale, and taking a holistic view on things. In Germany, in contrast, the debate appears to be narrowed down to a few aspects, with energy supply by renewable energy dominating the public debate. However, speakers and participants at the Bergen conference had an even broader view on the issue of a society beyond oil, also thinking about production and consumption, corruption and justice with respect to energy access, among others. I think that the discussion in Germany could benefit from such a broader perspective on a society beyond oil.

 
References
International Energy Agency (2011) Energy Policies of IEA Countries- Norway 2011 Review, http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/Norway2011_web.pdf (accessed 31.10.2015)

The Economist (2015) Norwegian Blues, http://www.economist.com/news/business/21672206-now-easy-times-are-over-norway-must-rediscover-its-viking-spirit-norwegian-blues (accessed 10.10.2015)

United Nations (1986) Declaration on the Right to Development, http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/41/a41r128.htm (accessed 31.10.2015)